The investigation of subjective experiences (SEs) of space and time is at the core of consciousness research. The term 'space' includes the subject and objects. The SE of subject, I-ness, is defined as 'Self'. The SEs of objects, subject's external body, and subject's internal states such as feelings, thoughts, and so on can be investigated using the protoexperience (PE)-SE framework. The SE of time is defined as 'phenomenal time' (which includes past, present and future) and the SE of space as 'phenomenal space'. The three non-experiential materialistic models are as follows: (I)
Introduction
In subjective experiences (SEs) of space and time, space includes the subject and objects. The SE of subject, I-ness, is called 'Self'; this is partly elaborated in (3) . The SEs of objects, subject's external body, and subject's internal states such as feelings, thoughts, and so on can be investigated using the PE-SE framework (37) . 2 An overview of consciousness and the structure of matter based on PE-SE framework is given in (19) . We can have SEs or first person experiences (1Es) of time, external space (subject and objects), and internal entities (emotions and thoughts). The SE of time is called phenomenal time (which includes past, present and future) and the SE of space is phenomenal space. We need time to bind all spatially disparate information. This time duration can be called 'duration of present or NOW', in which spatial-entanglement is involved. Phenomenal time is elaborated in (42) .
In this mini review article, my goal is (i) to compare the three non-experiential materialistic models: quantum-dissipation model (25) , soliton-catalytic model (8) , and 'sensation from evolution of action' model (13) , and (ii) to elaborate the need for the complementary experiential PE-SE framework (37) for elucidating the SEs of space and time and integrating various views.
Quantum-dissipation model vs. soliton-catalytic model
The quantum-dissipation model connects the discrete neural signals (DNS) to classical electromagnetic field (EMF) using quantum field theory (QFT) 3 and chaos theory, for example DNS↔EMF↔QFT model for memory (9, 24, 25, (45) (46) (47) . This is useful in the investigation of Self and phenomenal time (concisely described later).
In this model, "Water and other biochemical molecules entering brain activity are, indeed, all characterized by a specific electric dipole which strongly constrains their chemical and physical behavior" (25) . The electric dipole field can be considered as the fundamental units of the brain rather than neurons (29) . However, one could argue that both are related via neuronal-firing and other electrochemical activities of neurons and astroglia. In other words, classical electromagnetic field (EMF) arises from the electrochemical activity of discrete neural signals (DNS). The coupling between the classical electrochemical level and the quantum dynamical level (QFT) is analogous to the coupling between classical acoustic waves and phonons in crystals. Intrinsic features of the dissipative quantum model are as follows: (i) brain processes are intrinsically and inextricably dependent on the quantum noise 4 in the fluctuating random force in the brain-environment coupling, (ii) the chaotic behavior of the trajectories in the space of memory states. In the dissipative model, the 'brain (ground) state' may be represented as the superposition of the full set of memory states; therefore, previously recorded/'printed' information is not destroyed during current recording. In the non-dissipative model the number of freedom is missing and consecutive information 'printing' produces 'overprinting' (25) .
Dipole-rotation-and time-reversal symmetry breaking is equivalent to the recording of information in memory in quantum-dissipation model (25) ; this meaning of symmetry is different from the shape-symmetry in terms of uniform diameter and structure of microtubules for generating soliton/traveling-wave (8) .
Dissipative system for avoiding overprinting of new information for new memory in terms of superposition in quantum-dissipation model (25) is different from the traveling wave being nondissipative for robust recording in microtubules (8) .
The hypothesis is that "the soliton 'induces' a coherent state in the microtubule and that any catalytic events are due to this change of phase. Furthermore, solitons are non-dissipative in nondissipative media. However, the brain is considered an excitable medium. Traveling waves in these media are inevitably dissipative. In the soliton-catalytic model (8) , energy is dissipated via structure (fixed points that do not change under transformation)" (Davia, personal correspondence on December 3, 2007) .
Thus the soliton-catalytic model of (8) does not contradict the quantum-dissipative DNS↔EMF↔QFT model (25) , rather they are equivalent to each other.
Sensation from evolution of action (Humphrey's framework) vs. soliton-catalytic model
We need to distinguish perception from sensation. According to Humphrey (12, 13) , (i) when we see a red rose, we perceive the external presence of a rose of red color (perception) and we also have subjective experience of redness (sensation); (ii) sensation helps keeping perception honest: "Sensation lends a here-ness and a now-ness and a me-ness to the experience of the world, of which pure perception in the absence of sensation is bereft"; (iii) sensory quality is largely internal, covert and private; it appeared only after natural selection shaped it; (iv) "In the past my ancestors evolved to feel red this way because feeling it this way gave them a real biological advantage"; (v) 'self-representations arise through action, and that the "feeling self" may actually be created by those very sensory activities that make up its experience.'; and (vi) the quality of sensations (or SEs), though private today, has been shaped by natural selection in the past as a result of evolution: the primitive activity of sensing slowly became privatized from the overt public behavior and transformed into internal mental activity. The soliton-catalytic model (8) may be consistent with idea that sensation is the result of internalization of action via evolution and natural selection using the traveling wave. For example, when red light fell on the skin of primitive amoeba-like animal (floating in the ancient sea), it detected it and made a characteristic wriggle of activity (it wriggled 'redly') (13) . This wriggle can be considered as due to traveling wave of soliton-catalytic model, which when got internalized during evolution might have led to SE redness in humans. However, the explanatory gap remains in Humphrey's framework unless the PE-SE framework is invoked in the process of privatization.
PE-SE framework
The above models can be called 'non-experiential materialistic' model because subjective experiences (SEs) are assumed to be the emergent property of network or field, and hence has explanatory gap. Perception may be explained to some extent by DNS↔EMF↔QFT model and soliton-catalytic model; Humphrey's model can address how sensation evolved from action. However, to address the explanatory gap (how SEs can emerge in neural-nets), we need PE-SE framework (37) , which is a complementary to all non-experiential materialistic models because it allows experiential entities such as SE of subject, SE of objects, and SE of time into 'nonexperiential materialistic' models. Details are given in (3, 19, 37, 38, 41) .
Self
Temporal-entanglement is needed for the continuity of Self (3). Self is invariant with time as Self is preserved until death, although it is interrupted during sleep, anesthesia, and when subject is unconscious. The invariance of the dynamics of Self requires assigning a conserved entity over time. This time-invariant entity could be long-range spatiotemporal correlations that is like collective modes, such as Nambu-Goldstone (NG) boson modes in quantum field theory, which are wave-like and generated dynamically (25) . In soliton-model of (8), the emergent of Self may also include extra-neural interaction of the soliton/traveling-wave (energy) carrying self-related information with self-related structures (21, 22) . In PE-SE framework (37), Self is the SE of subject or I-ness.
Phenomenal time
The phenomenal time could be considered as reciprocal of critical flicker fusion frequency (i.e., 1/CFF), which is consistent with the 'psychological present': 'there is always an experienced duration in which experience does not change' (28, 31) .
Once the of electrical-dipole-rotational-symmetry and time-reversal symmetry are broken by recording new information (represented by a coherent condensation of the NG bosons), (a) 'NOW you know' occurs, (b) 'arrow of time', a partition in time evolution, and the distinction between the past and the future are introduced in brain dynamics, and (c) one moves forward in time (25) .
The spatial invariance of the phenomenal time requires assigning a conserved entity over space. This space-invariant entity could be long-range spatial correlations, which is wave-like collective modes, such as QFT-NG boson modes. They can be generated dynamically, which can explain memory (past) (25) . They can propagate over whole brain spatiotemporally. They are the carriers of the order in terms of long-range (a) spatial correlation for the present phenomenal time, (b) temporal correlation for past phenomenal time, and (c) spatiotemporal correlations to maintain continuity of Self until disintegration during death. The past in terms of memory could also be recoded in microtubule-network (50) (51) (52) (53) . In soliton-model (8) , the emergent of the phenomenal time may also include extra-neural interaction of the soliton/traveling-wave (generated during neuronal-firing) carrying time-related information with motion or flicker related structures, such as motion area V5, for CFF.
The duration of synchronization of neural activities of various areas is longer for more complex information processing; this duration is called 'coherence interval', which is vehicle for the moment of our conscious experience (31) . Neural synchrony has been considered as one of the neural correlates of consciousness (5, 7, 14, 17, 18, 26, 27) . One could define the time needed for temporal integration (or coherence interval) as access time, which is variable and may be related to access (reportable) awareness.
One of the main arguments for 'dendritic web' or 'hyper-neurons' with gap junction (11) being responsible for consciousness hinges on the hypothesis that the axonal-dendritic neurocomputational feedback networks of the brain fails to explain the correlation of consciousness with gamma synchrony. However, it is not clear that the gamma synchrony is the only neural correlate of consciousness (NCC). For subjective experience (SE), essential ingredients are wakefulness, attention (for access awareness), re-entry, (working) memory, and protoexperiences (37, 41) . In my view, there are 4 channels for information transfer: (i) Classical axonal-dendritic networks, (ii) Quantum dendritic webs with gap junction, (iii) Astro-glia-neuron interaction, and (iv) Extra-cellular electromagnetic field (such as generated by spikes). Their contributions to SE are not clear and are debatable. My view is that (i)-(iii) might be involved in specific and (iv) in non-specific information transfer. Assigning (i) to autopilot or non-conscious processing and (ii) to pilot or consciousness (Hameroff) is debatable. It may depend on how one defines the terms 'consciousness', 'unconscious' and 'non-conscious' because 'consciousness' is a confusing term as it has different meaning to different people. It is also useful to distinguish SE from the content of SE.
Phenomenal space
Space can be addressed by its following aspects: (i) Physical space: Compton wavelength of the electron is about 2.43x10 -12 meter; proton's diameter is 1.6 to 1.7×10 -125 m. (ii) Perceptual rate for space: this is cutoff frequency and is measured in cycles per degree (cpd) using grating and psychophysical method. It is about 60 cpd (4). Photoreceptor array in the human visual system can resolve in the order of ~150 cpd (20) . Hyper-or Vernier-acuity 5 is about 10 arc seconds; see also (48, 49) .
The phenomenal space could be defined as reciprocal of perceptual rate for space (i.e., 1/cutoff spatial frequency) in analogy to phenomenal time, which is consistent with the 'psychological space': there is always an experienced space in which subjective experience does not change even though external information could be varying.
Integration of reductive and non-reductive views
In reductive views, all phenomena can be reduced to the characteristics of elementary particles. However, before the introduction of PE-SE framework, elementary particles are considered as non-experiential material entities. That is why explanatory gap (how mind can emerge from nonexperiential matter) appeared. In PE-SE framework (37, 41) , strings or elementary particles (fermions and bosons) are considered to have irreducible fundamental SEs and/or PEs in superimposed form. Therefore, all phenomena including mental entities can be reduced to physics, where elementary particles are considered as carriers of SEs/PEs in unexpressed form. Since SEs are also consistent with non-reductive views, both reductive and non-reductive views can be integrated.
According to (31) , "When the visual system is stimulated, within a few hundreds of milliseconds all these neurons become engaged in a pattern of activity. I shall refer to the mechanisms that give rise to this pattern as the inner loop […] External factors contribute on a huge variety of time scales: evolution, development, socialization, learning, task and both indirect […] and instantaneous […] perception/action contingencies. Let us call the totality of all these interactions the outer loop […] Perceptual experience can be explained by contextualized brain dynamics. An inner loop of ongoing activity within the brain produces dynamic patterns of synchronization and de-synchronization that are necessary, but not sufficient, for visual experience. This inner loop is controlled by evolution, development, socialization, learning, task and perception-action contingencies, which constitute an outer loop. This outer loop is sufficient, but not necessary, for visual experience. Jointly, the inner and outer loop may offer sufficient and necessary conditions for the emergence of visual experience … The dynamics of chaotic itinerancy [for the inner loop] offers patterns of synchrony that appear during the laminar periods [the time periods during which a system dwells near a corrupted attractor and shows a pattern of synchronized activity that persists for a while, without being stable]." In PE-SE framework (37, 41) , both inner and outer loops resonate for the emergence of SEs.
Integration of implicit (state-approach), explicit (dynamic-approach), and contextual emergence views
According to (16) "In the implicit-assumption camp are those who conceptualize consciousness via terms such as states and representations (in what follows we will simply refer to this as the state approach). This way of conceptualizing consciousness entails implicit assumptions about the stability of consciousness because it focuses on conscious phenomena (e.g., memories, intentions, qualia and thoughts) that persist long enough to be considered individual conscious events entailing both content (i.e., the phenomenal 'feel' of a memory, intention or thought -see Bailey's contribution) and causal efficacy (i.e., the ability of memories, intentions and thoughts to make things happen in one's cognitive architecture) … In contrast to the implicit-assumption camp, those in the explicit assumption camp approach the issue of conscious stability directly. That is, their research focuses on the temporal dynamics by which conscious phenomena such as memories, intentions and thoughts come to be stable. … Given that state and dynamics theorists disagree as to where to look for consciousness, it is not clear to what extent the two can be integrated … One might, for example, utilize the notion of ontological relativity mentioned in Atmanspacher's contribution [(2)]. According to this framework, one makes ontological assumptions about phenomena at a lower level of scale (i.e., one assumes the phenomena at that level truly exist as described by science), so that one can use the entities at that level to make epistemological statements (i.e., statements based on observation) about phenomena at a higher level. For example, one might make ontological assumptions about chemistry in order to make epistemological statements about biology. A similar distinction is played out in Anderson's contribution [(1)] which distinguishes between realist approaches that make claims about what is metaphysically real and antirealist approaches that make claims that are relativized to a particular epistemic perspective … To be sure, there are many other possible combinations of varieties of realism and beliefs about science and reality. The point here is not to advocate one, but to simply make the case that the differences between state and dynamics theorists are not necessarily problematic. One can, for example, make ontological assumptions about the dynamics approach (i.e., believe that consciousness ultimately is a temporally-grounded multiscale phenomenon) while simultaneously being epistemic about the state approach (i.e., statements about 'what consciousness is' are restricted, when speaking scientifically, to epistemologically accessible phenomena that can be measured). Being aware of one's ontological assumptions in this manner might help to stave off arguments about a science of consciousness that emerge from one's simultaneous belief in various forms of realism. If this approach were to take hold, an integrated science of consciousness might ultimately come to be in which participants achieve an increased awareness of how their scientific assumptions play out in the varieties of realism."
Jordan and Ghin propose (proto-)consciousness as a contextually emergent property of selfsustaining systems (15) . The concept of contextual emergence is 'a non-reductive, yet welldefined relation between different levels of description of physical and other systems', such as 'the relation between neurobiological and mental levels of description' (2) . Their framework and also all materialistic frameworks, such as (6, 10, 23, 30) , are valid only if the PE-SE framework (37) is accepted in a complementary way. Otherwise they all fail to address type-1 explanatory gap: how subjective experiences (such as redness) can emerge from matter (such as self-sustaining cerebral neural-nets). The six views, summarized in (37) have been passionately discussed over 6000 years since RigVedic period. There are 3 aspects: structure, function, and experience. If PE-SE framework is ignored then materialistic frameworks can address only structure and function; they will never be able to address SEs. There is no way out, but to accept the dual-aspect PE-SE framework because this has the least number of problems compared to other views.
The framework of contextual emergence of higher level features (such as SEs) from lower level description of neural signals along with the contingent contextual conditions (2) may integrate state and dynamics based models, but explanatory gap remains. To minimize this problem, contextual emergence framework and PE-SE framework (37) can be combined in complementary manner. In PE-SE framework (37, 41) , the difference between reduction (higherlevel features can be reduced to lower level) features and emergence (emerged higher-level features such as SEs cannot be reduced to lower level) is minimized. This is because the basic elements are postulated to have two aspects: (i) they have elemental PEs (all types of SEs/PEs are in superimposed form, so elements are non-specific) as mental aspect and (ii) they have material aspect such as mass, charge, and spin. These two aspects co-evolve and co-develop so that the non-specificity of elements is transformed into the specificity of neural-nets by resonating the neural-net PEs with stimulus-PEs (37, 41) . In other words, emerged SEs can be reduced to elemental-PEs.
In dual-aspect view, the concept 'causality' is paired with 'physical', but 'physical' includes PE/SE; so both aspects are causally closed. In materialism, however, 'physical' does not include PE/SE and hence causality is paired with 'material', i.e., material world is causally closed and PE/SE is mere epiphenomenon.
Furthermore, Theory of Everything (TOE) must address consciousness, i. e., the unification/integration of SE/consciousness with string theory might be useful, in my view. In this way the term 'physicalism' is broadened to include PE/SE, whereas the term 'materialism' can still be used the way it always has been, i.e., physicalism = materialism + PE/SE.
Conclusion
The three non-experiential materialistic models: (quantum-dissipation model (25) , solitoncatalytic model (8) , and 'sensation from evolution of action' model (13) can address to some extent the function of structures, such as perception. They cannot address the explanatory gap (how mind can emerge from non-experiential matter). The complementary experiential PE-SE framework (37, 41) addresses this psycho-physical gap and elucidates the SEs of space and time. Various views can now be integrated.
